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Book Reviews
Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legalisation.
by John Keown, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.xx+318
pp . Index .
John Keown , currently Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy Professor at the
Kennedy Institute of Bioethics at Georgetown University, offers a
compelling, comprehensive, and clearly written argument against the
legalization of euthanasia.
The work includes an Introduction, six Parts subdivided into 21
Chapters, an important Afterword, bibliography, and index. In Part I
Keown gives reason s for rejecting definitions of euthanasia advocated by
its champions. One limits euthanasia to the active intentional termination
of life when death is judged beneficial, ignoring euthanasia by
intentionally killing people by acts of omission ; another conflates and
regards as morally equivalent treatment omissions intended to bring death
about and treatment omissions foreseen but not intended to be lifeshortening. Keown properly defines euthanasia as the intentional
termjnation of life by act or omission (a definition in harmony with the

Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia).
Keown devotes one chapter of Part I to a defense, philosophical and
jurisprudential, of the crucial moral difference between intending evil and
merely foreseeing evil , a di stinction crucial to the principle of double
effect.
In Part II Keown first takes up three arguments for VAE and PAS and
three counter-arguments. The arguments in favor are: (I) that life is not
always a benefit and that it is thus justifiable to kill a patient at his request
when he would be better off dead; (2) that respect for patient autonomy
requires VAE and PAS; (3) that present law is hypocritical in allowing
passive VAE and PAS while prohibiting active VAE and PAS.
Keown challenges these arguments by pointing out that the first is
not only inconsistent with the principle of the inviolability of life but is also
arbitrary and unjust in holding that only patients with arbitrarily defined
abilities have a right not to be killed intentionally, that the second fails to
recognize that many requests for euthanasia are not really autonomous and,
more importantly, that autonomy 's value lies not in making just any choice
but choices in accord with sound moral values, and that the third clearly
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leads to nonvoluntary active euthanasia (NVAE) and thus undercuts the
claim that its proponents support only VAE.
The final chapter of Part II is crucial to Keown's case against
legalizing VAE and PAS. He himself regards it as the centerpiece of his
study, for in it he develops two forms of the "slippery slope" argument
which holds that even if VAE and PAS were morally justifiable in certain
hard cases (which, as he makes clear, they are not) the killing of patients
could not be effectively controlled and limited to those cases.
Consequently, Keown argues, many who see nothing wrong with
VAE and PAS in principle do not want the law to permit it in practice
because it would likely lead to justifying NVAE. The slippery slope
argument holds that if a proposal is made to accept A (e.g., VAE), which is
not agreed to be morally objectionable, it would lead to B (e.g. , NVAE),
which is agreed to be morally objectionable.
Keown develops two forms of the argument, the empirical and the
logical. The empirical holds that one will slip from VAE to NVAE because
of the grave difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing safeguards to
prevent the slide (e.g. , to make sure that consent to euthanasia is truly
autonomous). The logical version holds that the slide will occur because
the arguments for accepting VAE and PAS logically provide arguments for
accepting NVAE .
Part IV provides massive evidence, based on Keown's own research
over ten years, to show that efforts in The Netherlands to restrict the killing
of terminal patients to VAE have failed miserably. Keown carefully
reviews empirical evidence provided primarily by two surveys carried out
by PJ. van der Maas and associates on behalf of the government, one in
1990 and the other in 1995, and secondarily by research done by himself
and other independent scholars, to support the conclusion. He argues that
the failure of the Dutch effectively to control VAE "lends weighty support
to the empirical slippery slope argument, and their growing approval of
NVAE illustrates the force of the logical slippery slope argument."
Part IV considers the legalization of PAS in the Northern Territory of
Australia in 1995 and by Oregon in the US in 1994 and implemented in
that state in 1997. Keown shows that the experience of Australia's
Northern Territory, where the law, called Rights of the Terminally III Act or
ROTTI permitting both VAE and PAS was repealed in 1997, fully supports
the validity of the slippery slope argument. The law lacked any way of
systematically supervising the application of its guidelines-themselves
not very precise-by medical doctors so that the possibility of effective
regulation of the law was even less than it had proved to be in the
Netherlands.
Keown regards the Oregon law-the Death with Dignity Act-as the
most permissive regime for PAS yet devised, with even less protection
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against abuse than the Dutch law or ROITI. Empirical evidence shows
that the law gives more power to doctors than to patients, its alleged
safeguards against abuse are largely illusory, and that most Oregon patients
seeking PAS are clinically depressed and yet are rarely referred for
counseling. The Oregon experience thus also confirms the validity of the
slippery slope arguments.
In Part V Keown reviews "expert" opinion on the advisability of
VAE and PAS , namely, the opinion provided by (1) medical committees
established by the British House of Lords, the Canadian Senate, and the
State of New York, (2) supreme courts in England, Canada, and the US
(considerable attention is given to the opinions in two cases - Washington
v. Gluckberg and Vacco, Attorney-General of New York et al. v. Quill et al
- reversing lower court decisions striking down laws prohibiting PAS),
and (3) the British, Canadian, and American medical associations. All
these experts vigorously oppose legalizing VAE and/or PAS.
Part VI is devoted to a detailed discussion of passive euthanasia or
euthanasia by withholding/withdrawing treatment, in particular the tube
feeding of severely compromised persons, and even more particularly of
those alleged to be in the "persistent vegetative state."
Keown begins this part with a presentation of the famous (or
infamous) Tony Bland case in England. The reasoning in Bland represents
a turn from an ethic respecting the inviolability of life toward a quality of
life ethic, holding that some lives are of no benefit or value to the persons
whose lives they are and that consequently they may be intentionally
terminated by starvation and dehydration. It regards individual autonomy
as demanding respect for choices simply by virtue of being choices,
ignoring their object. It fully legitimates intentional killing by acts of
omission while still prohibiting active euthanasia and is thus hypocritical.
It is moreover rooted in a terrible misunderstanding of the traditional ethic
respecting the inviolability of life, and opens the door to the killing of
patients who are not in the "persistent vegetative state."
Bland, in short, was bad law, but unfortunately, as Keown goes on to
show in the next chapter of Part VI, it was shortly followed by the 1999
guidelines prepared by the British Medical Association regarding the
withholding and withdrawing of treatments. These guidelines justify
nontreatment on the grounds, not that the treatments are burdensome or
useless, but on the grounds that the lives maintained by the treatments are
burdensome or useless and that one can thus intentionally terminate them
by purposeful omission. Keown shows how these guidelines lead to
justifying the intentional killing by omission not only of patients in the
"pvs" condition but also of persons severely impaired mentally. They also
appear to invite doctors to assist even suicidal treatment refusals, something
hard to square with the BMA opposition to PAS . The guidelines were
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revised in 2001. Unfortunately, however, nothing in the revision addresses,
let alone answers, criticism of the 1999 guidelines.
Keown then considers the Winterton Bill, introduced into Parliament
in December 1999 by Ann Winterton, in an attempt to reverse the
movement begun by Bland and developed by the BMA guidelines. It
provided that it is unlawful to deny treatment if the or a purpose of doing
so is to hasten or cause death. The BMA and British government opposed
Winterton on specious grounds, as Keown shows, and the bill was
withdrawn so that British law remains " in the morally and intellectually
mi sshapen state fashioned by the Law Lords in Bland. "
The important Afterword allows Keown to end his book on a hopeful
note. It concerns the Diane Pretty Case submitted to English courts in late
2001 (after the substance of Keown 's book had been written). Mrs. Pretty
maintained that the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms guaranteed a right to assisted suicide. Both the
English Divisional Court and the House of Lords, to which Pretty
appealed, unanimously dismissed her claim. Although in doing so, the
House of Lords neither endorsed nor overturned Bland, it correctly
understood the inviolability of human life principle as distinguishing
between treatment omissions intended to bring death about and those
merely foreseen to result in death. Moreover, the House of Lords
recognized that the legal prohibition of assisted suicide was consistent with
"a very broad international consensus" and that if the law were to allow
assisted suicide for the "non-vulnerable" it "could not be administered
fairly and in way which could command respect." The House of Lords also
noted the risk of the slippery slope evident in the arguments used to
support Pretty 's claim. Thus this case again illustrates the cogency of the
slippery slope arguments which, Keown notes, "continue to impede the
decriminalization ofYAE and PAS around the world."
Keown 's work is written in a very clear way. Moreover, each
Chapter and Part ends with a "Conclusion" in which Keown masterfully
summarizes the argument he has developed. His work is rooted in sound
ethical thought and is of particular value for its contribution to the
jurisprudential issues raised by euthanasia and assisted suicide. It is a most
welcome addition to the literature.

Reviewed by:
William E. May,
Michael J. McGivney
Professor of Moral Theology
The Catholic University of America
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